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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
-----------------------------------------------------------------
MARIUS BURKE, JR. ) 
Plaintiff and Respondent ) 
-vs- ) 
No. 18033 
NORMAN FARRELL ) 
Defendant and Appellant ) 
-----------------------------------------------------------------
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is an action in equity to have declared by Decree the 
relationship between the appellant and the respondent in certain 
property known as Fairfield Service, and Fairfield Enterprises, to 
have the alleged conduct of the Respondent treating himself as owner 
declared to be fraudulent, and to have respondent account for that 
property, or in lieu thereof, respond in damages. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
On August 13, 1981, the Honorable Ronald O. Hyde, District 
Judge, Second Judicial District, Weber County, Utah, entered a Judg-
ment and order divesting appellant of all interest in Fairfield 
Enterprises by way of an abandonment of his interest, and divesting 
appellant of all interest in Fairfield Service, determining that the 
respondent owed appellant $10,565.51 for that interest. Respondent 
was allowed to keep that $10,565.51 for further payment to creditors 
of Fairfield Service, the order determining that all debts of 
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Fairfield Service contracted between July 1, 1978 and December 31, 
1979, to be the sole responsibility of the appellant, and the 
appellant to further hold respondent harmless for all such debts. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Appellant asks that the judgment of the lower court be 
reversed and vacated, and that this court direct entry of Judgment 
for the appellant against the respondent in the amount of 
$66,331.33. 
In the alternative, the appellant asks that the property 
be sold; that all of the creditors be paid; and that the remainder, 
if any, be distributed to the parties according to their equities 
therein. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On or about July 1, 1978, the parties to this action 
entered into a partnership known as Fairfield Enterprises, with the 
respondent acting as managing partner and the appellant being vested 
with a 50% interest in the partnership (Plaintiff's Exhibit 1 
through 6). R.65. On or about the same time, the parties organized 
a business entity known as Fairfield Service consisting of a service 
station and repair shop with the appellant as operator (Plaintiff's 
Exhibit 7) R.67. This has been described by the respondent as a 
loose partnership R.136-137. 
Fairfield Enterprises provided a beginning intentory of 
$7, 831. 00 and entered into a purported lease with the appellant by 
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which Fairfield Enterprises received lease payments from Fairfield 
Service. (Plaintiffs Exhibit 7). 
Respondent acquired in his own name a special fuels dealer 
permit from the Utah State Tax Commission under which Fairfield 
Service was to, and did, operate (Defendants Exhibits 1 and 2), and 
Fairfield Enterprises, a partnership of Norman Farrell and Marius 
Burke registered with the Internal Revenue Service for employment 
tax purposes. (Defendants Exhibit 5) R.87. Other tax obligations 
were entered into as Fairfield Service, Marius Burke, or Marius 
Burke and Norman Farrell. (Defendant's Exhibits 8 through 10). 
Commercial accounts were charged under the name of Fairfield 
Service. 
At a later date, both parties undertook to expand Fair-
field Service adding to the building and adding a cafe and a line of 
groceries. R.90, R 92. Additional supplies, equipment, and inven-
tories were added from the resources of Fairfield Service, and from 
$16, 000. 00 put into Fairfield Service by the respondent. R.148. 
Monthly lease payments from Fairfield Service to Fairfield 
Enterprises were increased accordingly to cover additional costs of 
Fairfield Enterprises. R.148, R.149. 
On or about December 31, 1979, respondent ousted the 
appellant from operating Fairfield Service, R.155, with the 
appellant remaining in the repair shop for a short time. The ouster 
was made with representations that the respondent would continue to 
operate Fairfield Service, pay creditors, and settle up with the 
appellant for inventories, accounts receivable, payments for 
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appellants interest in Fairfield Enterprises, and other equities. 
R.155 through 157. 
In late January, 1980, Respondent declared the appellants 
interest in Fairfield Enterprises to be in default and gave the 
appellant written notice to that effect back dated to December 27, 
1979. R.219, R.233. 
Fairfield Enterprises, at the date of dissolution on or 
about January 1, 1980, had an equity of $125,000.00 in the business 
property occupied by Fairfield Service. 
Respondent says that the amount was due and owing to 
Estate Builders, his own private corporation, but there was no evid-
ence of such indebtedness. R.128-129. In addition, Fairfield Enter-
prises had an assset of $20,000.00 equity in an adjacent parcel of 
real estate., R.225, and claimed the $7 ,831.00 beginning inventory 
of Fairfield Service. None of this was disclosed to the appellant 
at the time of his ouster from Fairfield Service or at the time of 
the dissolution of Fairfield Enterprises. R.219, R155 through 158. 
In addition there were cash and bank deposits of $4,350.32 
as of January 1, 1980, claimed by the Respondent and allowed to him 
by the Lower Court in sett ling the Accounts of Fairfield Service. 
The facts show the appellant due $14,915.83 from the 
settlement of Fairfield Service, and the net worth of Fairfield 
Enterprises as of January 1, 1980, to be $152,831.00. Appellant 
concedes that his interest in Fairfield Enterprises should be 
diminished by the amount of $25,000.00 R.219. For the settlement of 
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Fairfield Service, a one half interest in Fairfield Enterprises, and 
the deduction of $25,000.00, the appellants true interest in 
Fairfield Service and Fairfield Enterprises, with some creditors and 
many taxes remaining unpaid, should be $66,331.33. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
TO ALLOW ONE TO TAKE TITLE AS SECURITY FOR A LOAN 
TO LATER EMBARK ON A SCHEME TO DEFRAUD ONE WHO 
SOLICITED HIS SERVICES AS A LENDER IS ERROR. 
Respondent claims title to Fairfield Service on the basis 
of what he claims to be a loan from him to the business known as 
Fairfield Service, claimed to be the sole proprietorship of the 
Appellant and as such, his sole property. The lower court has held 
it to be no loan at all, but an investment justifying the ouster of 
the appellant from his business. This constitutes a fraud on the 
appellant who solicited the respondent's services as a lender with 
the respondennt purporting to make a loan. At some later time, he 
then ousted the appellant summarily of his entire property interest 
for purposes of conducting the appellant's business as his own. 
Such conduct is fraud. Graham v. Street, 166 P2 524 (Utah, 1946). 
POINT II 
THE BREACH OF A DUTY TO DISCLOSE BY THE DOMINANT 
PARTY IN A CONFIDENTIAL RELATIONSHIP IS 
CONSTRUCTIVE FRAUD. 
The managing partner of a partnership owes the highest 
fiduciary duty to his co-partner. It is one of the oldest rules of 
law that a person in such a position shall not profit at his part-
ners expense acquiring his partner's interest while not disclosing 
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his adverse interest to his partner. See: W.A. McMichael 
Construction Co. vs. D and W. Properties, Inc., 356 So. 2d 1115 (La. 
App. 1978). Presumption of fraud may be based on the relationship 
alone. Renshaw v. Tracy Loan and Trust Co., 49 P2d 403 (Utah, 1935) 
Blodgett v. Martsch, 590 P2d ·298 (Utah, 1978). 
POINT III 
A COURT OF EQUITY SHOULD NOT ASSIST ONE IN 
CIRCUMSTANCES HE HIMSELF HAS CREATED. A 
PARTY STEEPED IN FRAUD SHOULD HAVE NO EQUIT-
ABLE RELIEF. 
The dee is ion of the lower court is a clear abuse of the 
powers of equity. Equity will not come to the aid of one who has 
placed himself in an inequitable position, nor will equity condone 
fraud. Battistone v. American Land and Development Co. 607 P2d 837 
(Utah, 1980). 
(Okla., 1973). 
State ex Rel Burke v. Oklahoma City, 522 P2d 612 
POINT IV 
THE CHOICE OF REMEDY BELONGS TO THE VICTIM OF 
THE FRAUD AND A CHOICE CANNOT BE FORCED UPON 
HIM. 
As stated by this Court, the offended party in an action 
for fraud has the opt ion to elect the choice of remedy, and the 
right to recover damages for the fraud is not easily lost. The 
party does not waive the fraud by an election to affirm an 
agreement, complete its performance and retain what was received 
under it; and such a party is not precluded from recovering damages 
sustained by reason of the fraud. The proper measure of damages is 
the difference between the value received and the value it actually 
had. Dugan vs. Jones, 615 P2d 1239 (Utah, 1980). 
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Also the Respondent as managing partner was a qualified 
witness to establish the true value of Fairfield Enterprises as of 
January 1, 1980. Atkinson vs. Marquart 541 P2d 556 (Ariz. 1975). 
Where such undisputed facts are conclusive of the issue between the 
parties, the appellate court may order judgment entered as required 
by the facts and law. See: Woodman vs. Knight, 380 P2d 222 (Idaho, 
1963) 
POINT V 
IT IS ERROR TO FIND AN ABANDONMENT OF PROPERTY BASED 
ON AN AGREEMENT PROCURED BY FRAUD AND WHERE THE 
DEFRAUDED PARTY DOES NOT KNOW THE TRUE VALUE OF WHAT 
HE SUPPOSEDLY ABANDONS. 
The lower court found that the appellant had abandoned 
whatever interest he had in Fairfield Enterprises. The abandonment 
would have had to have been upon the reliance upon his managing 
partner who stood in a fiduciary relationship to the Appellant. 
Huffington vs. Upchurch, 532 SW 2d 576, (Texas, 1976). 
The finding of the lower court amounted to a holding that 
as a matter of law, appellant had abandoned any interest. However, 
one who relies upon an abandonment has the burden of establishing it, 
and there must be proof of an intent to relinquish a known right. 
Huffington vs. Upchurch, Supra. Where one has no knowledge of the 
extent of the interest he supposedly abandons, there can hardly be an 
abandonment of that interest. 
POINT VI 
IT IS NOT REQUIRED THAT A SERIES OF TRANSACTIONS 
SO CLOSELY RELATED IN TIME AND FACT TO BE GROUPED 
AND COMPARTMENTALIZED TO SEPARATE THEIR LEGAL EFFECT. 
7 
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For the Court to find two separate and distinct business 
entities in Fairfield Service and Fairfield Enterprises flys in the 
face of reality, and is not required where the transactions were 
entered into at the same time and for a single purpose. This treat-
ment exhalts form over substance as an engine for injustice. See: 
Graham vs. Street, Supra. As the respondent stated: 
"A. Mr. Farrell came in with nothing. He 
contributed nothing to the business. 
Q. And he werit out with nothing. 
A. He went out with a lot that he took from 
The business. R.158 Lines 24-28. 
and, 
Q. So in March of 1980, you were still of the 
opinion that Farrell had to pay all of the bills 
and you got all of the goodies; is that true? 
A. Yes, that's correct. R.159 lines 27-30. 
In other words, a man's total involvment and one and a half 
years building a business where none existed does not count for any-
thing, because he contributed no money to the business. Instead he 
gets the total accounts payable accrued in building the assets. 
This is a case in equity, and it is for this Court to find the facts 
by a clear preponderance, and to do justice. 
C 0 N C L U S I 0 N 
The respondent should not have judgment in this matter to 
use to deny third parties, their just claims. 
lower court should be vacated and reversed. 
8 
The judgment of the 
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Principles of partnership law indicate that in this case, 
creditors should be satisfied from the assets of the business, and, 
if this is not possible, the Appellant should have judgment of 
$66, 331. 33 against the respondent for damages from which to satisfy 
the claims of creditors. 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I served two full, true and correct 
copies of the foregoing Brief of appellant to Herwig Glander, 
Attorney for respondent at 466 E. 500 So., Suite 101, Salt Lake 
City, Utah, 84111, by U. S. Regular Mail, postage prepaid, this ..f:Z 
day of December, 1981. 
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